Publication | Page 655 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2025)

Table of Contents
Revival of Mujahideen Power Warlords and the Presidential Elections Poppy Boom and Mujahideen Activism Challenges of Disarmament Karzai’s Balancing Act References/End Notes US-NATO Relations US-EU Ties Onward Ho! References/Endnotes The Kyoto Treaty: Key Features The Message is in the Warming References/End Notes
Warlords and Karzai’s Balancing Act January 2005 Vishal Chandra

On March 1, 2005, Afghan President Hamid Karzai appointed Uzbek militia commander Abdul Rashid Dostum as Chief-of-Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan armed forces – a post which he holds.1 For those who know and understand the politics of Afghanistan, such a development was hardly surprising. Ever since Karzai assumed the chairmanship of the interim administration in December 2001, Kabul has not been able to assert full authority over its provinces. Much of the country remains parcelled out among various regional and factional commanders, who often have large private armies. The mujahideen commanders have shown tremendous survival instinct if one goes through the annals of the Afghan conflict. After 9/11 when the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom and decided to vanquish the Taliban, it had to align with the militia commanders of the Northern Alliance. With the displacement of the Taliban, the mujahideen commanders made a quick comeback and were soon working with the UN in Bonn in late November 2001 to prepare a roadmap for peace and democracy in Afghanistan. Time and again, the mujahideen have proved to be an abiding factor in Afghan politics. Despite all claims of not working with the warlords if elected President, Karzai has not been able to keep them out of his new cabinet or break their stranglehold on the Afghan political structure.

Revival of Mujahideen Power

With the Taliban controlling three-fourths of the country, except areas controlled by Tajik Commander Ahmed Shah Masud in the north-eastern provinces of Badakhshan and Takhar, most of the mujahideen commanders had either sought refuge in neighbouring countries or were on the run. The ouster of the Taliban by mid-November 2001 not only facilitated the return of the mujahideen but also led to reworking of their relationship with the US-led coalition. In the absence of any other credible local force, the US-led coalition had to turn to the mujahideen, particularly the Tajik militia which till date remains the most organised of all groups, to launch an offensive against the Taliban and their Al Qaida allies. With the US launching a heavy air offensive on Taliban strongholds in the south and southeastern Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance commanders led the ground offensive from the north and took control of Kabul on November 13, 2001.

Soon negotiations followed under UN auspices in Bonn on November 27, 2001, seeking to chart out a roadmap for establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan. The very fact that the mujahideen were the key constituents of the parleys that ultimately led to the signing of the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Governing Institutions’2 on December 5, 2001, bears testimony to their position in Afghan politics. Their key role and position was ensured in the provisional governments that followed in Kabul. Their overbearing presence was apparent all through the phase of provisional governments and remains so, though currently not as pronounced as before, in the newly elected government of President Karzai.

Keeping the various diverse constituents of the provisional governments together must have been a challenging task before Hamid Karzai and his US and UN backers. The mujahideen domination in post-Taliban provisional governments, along with their whole gamut of ideological differences and interest disparities, continued to lend fragility to the Bonn-mandated political process. The Pashtun- Northern Alliance divide, a legacy of Afghan history and over two decades of ethnic power struggle, has percolated down to the Karzai-led provisional governments and was well-reflected during the Constitutional Loya Jirga3 as well as in the run-up to the presidential elections held on October 9, 2004. That elections would be fought along ethnic lines was an anticipated fact.

Warlords and the Presidential Elections

Due to the deteriorating security situation, incomplete voter registration and various logistical deficiencies, elections were twice postponed – first from June to September and then to October 2004. Compelled by the enormity of the challenge in holding such a huge nationwide electoral exercise, the UN-Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body of Afghanistan decided on July 9, 2004, to go ahead with the presidential elections in October 2004, postponing the parliamentary elections until April-May 2005. But it is clear that the impediments to the presidential election continue to be in play, as parliamentary elections have already been delayed till mid-September this year.

In the run-up to the presidential elections, Karzai tried to break away from the hold of mujahideen warlords by way of his greater political assertion. He tried to sideline them and weaken their electoral prospects, particularly the minority ethnic factions of the former Northern Alliance. The removal of the self-styled ‘Amir’ and powerful governor of the western province of Herat, Ismail Khan, and dropping of his powerful defence minister and leader of Tajik militia, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, as his vice-presidential running mate just before the elections, should be seen in this context. Karzai attempted to strike an ethnic balance and at the same time cut into the vote constituencies of Tajik candidate Yunus Qanooni and Hazara candidate Mohammad Mohaqqiq by nominating Ahmed Zia Masud, brother of late Tajik Commander Ahmed Shah Masud, and Hazara leader Mohammad Karim Khalili, as his vice-presidential nominees. The main objective was to pre-empt the ethnic bloc voting in the north. Karzai could not have relied completely on his Pashtun constituency where he had a limited appeal, and also because of relatively low voter registration in the predominantly Pashtun south and south-eastern provinces. With Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras having declared their own presidential candidates, the ethnic divisions were complete.

In the October 9, 2004 presidential elections, Karzai’s victory was a foregone conclusion. However, belying expectations, Karzai secured 55.4 per cent of the total votes polled, with Tajik candidate Yunus Qanooni the distant second at 16.3 per cent, followed by Hazara and Uzbek candidates, Mohammad Mohaqqiq and Abdul Rashid Dostum at third (11.7 per cent) and fourth (10.3 per cent) positions respectively.4

Most of the election candidates, if not all, were either the mujahideen warlords or proxies of one or the other ethnic factions. Of the top four presidential candidates, Mohaqqiq and Dostum are known militia commanders. Similarly, Qanooni had the full backing of the powerful Tajik militia leader and former defence minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim. Thus, the influence of mujahideen leaders and commanders, and the ethnic pattern of voting as witnessed in the presidential elections, speaks volumes about the possible political complexion that is likely to emerge in the run-up to parliamentary elections.

Poppy Boom and Mujahideen Activism

Following the restoration of the mujahideen power after the ouster of the Taliban, one notices a sudden spurt in opium poppy production. The linkage between the warlords, local commanders, poppy cultivators and heroin traders apparently runs deep in Afghanistan. Drug money plays a very crucial role in financing and sustaining warlordism in the country. It provides warlords with the necessary financial resources to maintain huge private militias and also to run the local economy. Many of these warlords or their proxies, who encouraged poppy production in the regions they control, often held senior positions in the Karzai-led provisional governments. Added to this, Karzai’s and the West’s dependency on these warlords in keeping the Bonn-mandated political process going has been a major restraining factor in the fight against the drug menace in Afghanistan. The contradictions in the US’ twin objectives of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics in Afghanistan have been apparent all through these three years.

Poppy production in the country has been growing unabated since 2002. Except for the year 2001, when poppy production plummeted to a mere 185 metric tonnes from 3,276 metric tonnes the previous year, largely due to a strict ban imposed by the Taliban that year, Afghanistan has been providing almost threequarters of the world’s total illicit opium production. According to the Afghan Opium Survey 2004 released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), production grew from 3,600 metric tonnes in 2003 to 4,200 metric tonnes in 2004, an increase of about 17 per cent and the highest since the year2000. The total area under opium poppy cultivation registered a staggering growth of 64 per cent, from about 80,000 hectares in 2003 to a record level of 131,000 hectares in 2004. Poppy is now being grown in all 34 provinces, up from 28 provinces in the year 2003, with Helmand, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan leading the tally. The drug trade in the country is currently valued at $2.8 billion, up by more than 20 per cent since 2003. The opium economy of Afghanistan is now almost 60 per cent of its 2003 gross domestic product which was US $4.6 billion.5

Challenges of Disarmament

The UN-led and Japan-sponsored Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation Programme (DDR), launched in 2003, is very crucial in diluting the powers of the warlords by disbanding their militia and integrating them into the upcoming Afghan national army and police force. So far, the programme cannot be said to have been very effective. Though the UN claims that nearly 80 per cent of the estimated 50,000 militiamen have been covered under the programme,6 scepticism remains. Most of the warlords, particularly those having militia running into several thousands, have so far resisted any disbandment of their militia or surrender of heavy weaponry. It is notable that warlords who were party to the Bonn Agreement and later held positions in the provisional governments too remain disavowed to the programme. In fact, the DDR has never been high in the order of priority for various compulsive factors. The US-led coalition’s continued dependence on various Afghan militias, officially designated as Afghan Military Force, in its operations against the Taliban and its allies in the south and south Warlords eastern provinces, has been a limiting factor. Apart from this, in the absence of an effective national army and limited peacekeeping by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), it is unlikely that the DDR will be effective.

Karzai’s Balancing Act

Karzai had declared right before the presidential elections that the biggest threat to Afghanistan is from the warlords and had promised the Afghan people that he would not work with them if elected president. In the run-up to the elections, he did try to sideline them and has since been relatively politically assertive. But at the same time, realising the socio-political complexities of the country and his own fragile position in the Afghan political structure, he has been cautious in confronting the regional strongmen and mujahideen commanders. In fact, Karzai has been striving for some kind of an understanding with them so as to secure his position as well as to carry forward the peace and reconstruction efforts. Given his limited authority and resource constraints, Karzai and the international community are more than aware of the need to accommodate the warlords despite all rhetoric.

It appears that Karzai and his western backers are eager to keep the powerful militia commanders away from Kabul and at the same time engage them by appointing them in the provinces. For instance, Karzai appointed two warlords and his former ministerial colleagues, Gul Agha Sherzai and Syed Hussain Anwari, as governors of Kandahar and Kabul, respectively. Karzai had previously removed them along with his defence minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim from his transitional government in the run-up to the presidential elections. Similarly, the removal of Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani had more to do with mollifying the mujahideen, who were opposed to his policies and to his proximity with the West. The appointment of Ismail Khan in the new cabinet as energy minister sends two clear messages across the country. First, it is expected of the extra-constitutional authorities in the provinces to accept the authority of Kabul. If a warlord does this, he is likely to be rewarded with a position in the government, appropriate to his previous rank. Secondly, Kabul is ready to work with the factional warlords and commanders if the latter are ready to relinquish their military role and take to a civilian role within the purview of constitutional provisions. Clearly, President Karzai is striving hard to strike a balance between the political aspirations of the mujahideen warlords and the necessity to have more qualified and capable people in the cabinet to carry forward the reforms. Karzai has also time and again reiterated that the Taliban and their Hizb-e-Islami allies are welcome to participate in the political process and contribute to the ongoing reforms and reconstruction in the country.

During the negotiations preceding the announcement of a new cabinet on December 23, 2004, Karzai unsuccessfully tried to persuade his Tajik presidential rival and former ministerial colleague, Yunus Qanooni, to accept a position in his government, probably that of the defence minister.7 Karzai has certainly kept doors open for the leaders of the Panjshiri faction. Given his limited authority and the political influence and power of the Tajik militia, Karzai is well aware of the fact that at some stage his government will have to compromise with the Panjshiri leadership, without which Kabul would not be able to extend its authority in the northern areas. The Karzai Government has already announced special lifetime privileges for the leader of the Tajik militia and his former defence minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim, allowing him to retain his military rank of Marshal lifelong with all military rights and privileges.8

The new cabinet announced by President Karzai is certainly going to witness many reshuffles in course of time. The cabinet right now has many new faces, mostly professionals and technocrats, and has a dominant Pashtun presence. Only two members of the previous cabinet have retained their posts – Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and Interior Minister Ali Ahmed Jalali – in the 27-member cabinet. Karzai will have to cut deals with the powerful warlords from the minority ethnic groups, particularly Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Yunus Qanooni and Mohammad Mohaqqiq in the run-up to parliamentary elections. The recent appointment of Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum as Chief of Staff can be seen as a step in that direction and an indication of the hard bargain that lies ahead.

Warlords will remain central to Afghan society and politics so long as Afghanistan fails to establish functional institutions of governance across the country. The Karzai Government will have to speed up reconstruction and the reforms process in order to bolster its presence in the provinces. The international community too will have to be prepared for a long-term engagement in Afghanistan. Disarmament and counter-narcotics efforts will have to be prioritised to dilute the power of extraconstitutional authorities in the provinces. However, in the absence of a credible national army, law enforcement agencies and an independent judiciary, it is unlikely that Kabul would be able to assert its authority to the provinces in the near future. Until then, the warlords would remain embedded in their near-independent fiefdoms, with Kabul dependent on their cooperation to maintain some semblance of Afghan statehood.

References/End Notes

South Asia Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Taliban Transatlantic Relations: Bridging the Divide January 2005 Prasad P. Rane

US President George W Bush’s whirlwind tour of Europe – Belgium, Germany and Slovakia – between February 21 and 24, can be seen as an attempt to bridge the transatlantic divide and iron out differences, so as to make a fresh start to working with the European allies rather than against them. The transatlantic rift had surfaced in 2003 when the Europeans disagreed with America’s unilateralist approach in Iraq.

President Bush’s visit followed the elections in Iraq, where voters opened the doors of democracy in the country. Bolstered by this positive development, Bush’s visit, dubbed as a “listening visit”, sought to lend an ear to his European counterparts on certain irritant issues which were disturbing the cohesiveness of the alliance, particularly those related to security concerns. In order to chart the future course of transatlantic relations, two significant issues need to be put into perspective. First, the emerging trends in US-NATO relations and second, the European Union (EU) ties.

US-NATO Relations

As part of his itinerary, President Bush attended the Heads of State and Government meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The agenda of the summit included NATO’s participation in the ‘training operations’ in Iraq; the ongoing expansion of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan as well as enhanced cooperation and coordination with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom; NATO’s commitment to the Balkans; and its engagement in the Middle East1. However, this was overshadowed by the discussion on German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s speech at the 41st Annual Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 12. In his address, Schröder called into question the usefulness of NATO and chided Washington for failing to recognise the interests of Germany and Europe, and indicated quite clearly at an overhaul of the alliance.2 He said, “I believe that the transatlantic partnership must take such changes into consideration. And, to be honest, it does so insufficiently at present. This becomes clear when we look at the institutions which are supposed to serve this partnership. The admission of new members is proof that NATO continues to be attractive. And NATO’s presence in Afghanistan has highlighted how helpful its military organisation can be even in distant crises. However, it is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.”3

Schröder’s remarks can be viewed as an effort to underplay NATO vis-à-vis European unity and, in particular, the EU’s emergence as an independent military bloc in the post-9/11 security environment. While it found due favour with French President Jacques Chirac; the US and the UK, however, were clearly more circumspect on the suggested shift from NATO to the EU in the transatlantic relations.4 Interestingly, the NAC endorsed the importance of giving NATO a stronger political role. On this issue, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer agreed to forward specific proposals for enhancing NATO’s political agenda.5

In an effort to weed away prejudices and misconceptions, President Bush welcomed the decision taken by the 26-member NATO to set aside differences over Iraq and contribute to the organisation’s training of Iraqi security forces, either in or outside Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment.6 However, there is a caveat, which Bush has to contend with and which in a sense reflects his anxiety to bury the hatchet over the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and simultaneously forging a ‘united commitment’ to his administration’s declared priorities of fighting terrorism and spreading democracy in the Middle East. The Germans will not be training the Iraqis on their soil but will conduct such programmes in the UAE7 and France’s participation will remain confined to donations – up to €2 million ($2.6 million) – rather than any active participation. Interestingly, France has committed just one official from its NATO office, though it is still unclear whether it will be a part of the mission in Iraq, for the stability and pursuit of the political process laid down in UN Resolution 1546.8 It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the European initiatives are more symbolic in nature and will do little to alleviate the immense pressure on the US military in Iraq. That Bush was grateful to the alliance partners’ commitment in providing help for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as well as the upcoming parliamentary elections in Afghanistan9demonstrates Washington’s awakening to the political reality in Europe and crucially, a willingness to shed some of its assertiveness. Two years ago, millions took to the streets of Europe to express anguish, dismay and anger over US military aggression against Iraq, leading to bitter hostility between the two.

US-EU Ties

President Bush also visited the EU headquarters in Brussels and showed optimism on the success of the European project of ‘integration’. Indeed, a stronger Europe, as an ally of the US, will always increase the potential of the transatlantic alliance. Bush showed willingness in setting aside differences with the EU and working on a partnership of equals, rather than a relationship of dependence so as to “forge ahead for a stronger partnership in the areas of commerce and trade.”10 Echoing the attitude of “let bygones be bygones” expressed by Bush, the European leaders, while acknowledging that the US invasion of Iraq had clearly divided Europe and America, however, retreated from an open confrontation over the Republican Administration’s foreign policy.

Behind the rhetoric of the ‘new era in transatlantic relations’, economic and geopolitical tensions quite clearly persist; and these were acutely reflected over the issue of lifting arms embargo on China. Even Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had raised concerns over this issue when she toured Europe and a few weeks prior to Bush’s visit, the House of Representative had voted 401 to 3 for a resolution condemning the EU for pledging to lift the arms embargo to China, which has been in effect since 1989 following the events in Tiananmen Square.11 At the start of his tour, Bush conveyed in no uncertain terms the grievances of his administration to the Europeans over EU’s rapprochement moves with China. Clearly for Washington, transfer of weapons and technology to China will disturb the military balance between China and Taiwan. Beyond this immediate concern, however, is the fear that closer economic ties between the EU and China will pose an immense challenge to the US economy. Transatlantic relations will truly be tested in the coming months over the decision of lifting the embargo. It has the potential to even split the Europeans. The French and Germans, in particular, have been pressing the EU to reconsider lifting the arms embargo. Maintaining the cohesiveness of the Union will depend on the next presidency, which will be Britain’s, a task not easy given its close association with the US.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, while both the Americans and Europeans agree to the dangers of proliferation, the difference has been in the approach to resolving the crisis. The Europeans have refused to join Washington’s bellicose threats against Iran, preferring diplomacy to aggression. The European are not only sceptical but question Washington’s policy to wage unprovoked “preventive” war. Germany, along with France and Britain, is working together to “persuade” Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.12

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In contrast, there is clear convergence on the Israeli-Palestine issue. The Europeans are willing to play a proactive role and use their influence and good offices to push for a negotiated settlement and also help bring stability in the region.13 Both the Americans and the Europeans accept that the prospects for peace are better than ever before and are willing to work together for a negotiated, two- State solution, as defined in the Middle East road map.14

Onward Ho!

Bush has clearly learnt from his “listening visit” – the first in his second term – that he carries a heavy burden of his go-it-alone foreign policy. Not surprisingly, therefore, Bush softened his language, if not completely diluting his conservative agenda, and propped up the diplomacy of consultation on contentious issues. In spite of some irritants, particularly on China, the Republican Administration has adopted a conciliatory approach and at this juncture, transatlantic relations at the tactical level look bridged. The European Presidency and NATO Secretary General along with the US President repeatedly shared the views of a strong Atlantic Alliance based on shared values and common purpose.

A significant trend that emerged from Bush’s visit was the transformation of NATO from a military organisation to a politico-military organisation. However, for the US, NATO and EU have clear-cut roles. NATO is looked upon as an organisation dealing with the problems related to security and EU is seen as an arrangement for the better working of European nations amongst themselves on trade and economic related issues.

Except on the issue of China, President Bush was successful in getting European support, particularly on NATO training missions in Iraq. With ‘Atlanticists’ like Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as the Secretary General of NATO – he has persuasively argued for a stronger NATO and warned against duplication with the formation of a separate European Security Arrangement – Bush can, for the time being, be assured that NATO will survive the attacks of the ‘Europeanists’. For Bush, given the fiscal crisis back home, it is paramount that NATO takes on a greater role in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with France and Germany not participating wholeheartedly, success is still doubtful.

Both, President Bush and the European leaders made it abundantly clear that transatlantic relations serve the economic, political as well as military interests of both sides. Bush has clearly realised that unilateralism cuts both way and that in an interdependent international system, such alliances are essential in creating a framework to tackle a host of problems and security threats.

References/Endnotes

Nuclear and Arms Control North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), United States of America (USA), European Union Two Cheers to Kyoto Treaty January 2005 Uttam Kumar Sinha

We live in an age of risk – the “risk society” to use a notable phrase of German sociologist Ulrich Beck. There seems to be no escape from the culture of warning and the politics of prediction, prevention and compensation. Every now and then, the world is subjected to comprehensive reports on the global impact of climate change. They underline the things that have now become all too familiar: melting ice caps in the polar region and submergence of tropical islands, with the poor underdeveloped countries bearing the brunt of these devastating changes. All in all, a grim picture of floods, drought and suffering. For the not-so-amused greenbashers, who consider all this a load of hubris and exaggeration, there is an element of concern too – collapse of the tourism industry, as tourists bound for tropical paradises and the glistening Alpine skiing retreats will have no destination to go to. Clearly, endless prosperity, a hi-tech economy, a bullish market and titanic mergers that stimulate greater growth as well as many of the human activities (anthropogenic factors) that modify or destroy the natural ecosystem are at the heart of the problem. Problems that get compounded due to faultlines like the oil crisis, the debate over renewable and non-renewable energy resources and, of course, atmospheric warming – all of which are interlinked. The message is frighteningly clear; more freak weather conditions, massive displacement of populations and enormous loss of life.

On February 16, 2005, the world took its first concerted step to roll back the emission of ‘greenhouse gases’ believed linked to climate change with the enactment of the Kyoto Treaty. After seven years of wrangling and harangues that made the 1997 Kyoto Protocol a typical case of ‘no step forward, two steps back’ and despite all scepticism challenging its efficacy, the 2005 Treaty has a certain symbolic value attached to it that there is no mutual gain, unless there is collective cooperation.

This symbolism finds resonance in Rousseau’s fable about the ‘hunter and the stag’. Rousseau describes five hunters who join hands to hunt a stag. They agree to cooperate and mount a coordinated hunt and to share the spoils equally, giving each sufficient meat to feed his family. But then one of the five breaks the ring to pursue a rabbit that provides enough food for his own family. As a result, the stag escapes and the other four hunters go hungry. The moral is that placing personal needs (read individual interests of States) over the collective destroys cooperation. Issues relating to global warming have for long been bitterly trapped in this fable. Negotiations on environmental issues are a complex process, for they are a combination of scientific uncertainty with national interest and of social activism with economics. Any negotiations towards cooperation can only be successful when competing interests find a way to generate mutual gain. From 1997 till the enactment of the Kyoto Treaty, politics and economics played a key role in policy discussions on global warming and routinely took precedence over scientific arguments. The following factors were evident:

First, the linkage factor. The ability of the ‘South’ developing countries to use environmental issues as an important tool for bargaining is a significant feature in the ‘North-South’ divide. For developing countries, linking environmental destruction to their poverty and population was a way to extract aid and technology transfer from the developed ‘North’ countries in order to speed up development activities, putting them on the road to solving the ills present in their sphere.

Second, the scientific findings. These invariably come into conflict with the political choices the countries exercise. While scientific findings clearly indicated that the environment was rapidly declining with the rise in global temperature, yet State policies, as witnessed in the negotiation process, were conditioned by the impact of such findings to their interest. For example, the low-lying countries felt more vulnerable to the global rise in temperature which could submerge their countries owing to the rise in the sea level, accompanied by the melting of the ice in the polar region. For such countries, which fall mainly in the ‘South’, it was imperative that the ‘North cut down carbon emission. Against this, the ‘North’ countries were not vulnerable to rising sea levels. Instead, reducing emission was a major domestic worry, as it would mean closing industries leading to unemployment. This, in particular, was the tone of the US vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol – a mindset articulated by George Bush Sr. in Rio in 1992: “I have some responsibility for a cleaner environment, and also a responsibility to families in this country who want to work, some of whom can be thrown out of work if we go for too costly an answer to some of these problems. And I am not going to forget the American family. And if they don’t understand that in Rio, too bad.”1

Third, the political consideration. National interest, sovereignty and the right to development overshadowed the negotiation process. Despite the realisation that the North could not do without the South and vice-versa, power politics between the two sides dominated discussions, particularly on issues relating to the emissions’ ‘trading’ mechanism, the clean development mechanism and carbon ‘sinks’. The US, in order to set the agenda, strongly advocated emission cuts to those industrialised countries that backed clean-up projects in the developing countries. The ‘South’, on the contrary, felt that such a swap offer would restrict their right to development, making them hostage to US dictates.

The Kyoto Treaty: Key Features

Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, industrialised countries committed themselves to binding reductions in greenhouse gases emissions (GHGs), averaging 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The mandated reduction ranged from 8 per cent for the European Union to 7 per cent for the US and 6 per cent for Japan and Canada. Australia was allowed an 8 per cent increase, while Russia’s target was fixed at 0 per cent. Compared with the opening positions in the negotiations – 15 per cent for the EU; 5 per cent for Japan and 0 per cent for the US2 – the end result in the Kyoto Treaty can be summed up as a tidy compromise.

The agreement, ratified by 141 nations, calls on 36 industrialised countries – the US, Australia and Monaco are not part of the treaty – to rein in the release of carbon dioxide and five other gases, i.e. methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, from the burning of oil and coal and other processes. Implementation of the agreement was delayed by a struggle to meet the requirement that the Treaty be ratified by those countries that account for 55 per cent of the world’s emissions. The Clinton Administration signed the protocol in 1997, but the Senate refused to ratify it, citing potential damage to the US economy and insisting that it also cover countries with fast-growing economies, such as China and India. President Bush’s unilateral withdrawal from the protocol temporarily jeopardised the Treaty.3 However, the ‘55 per cent’ goal was reached in October 2004, nearly seven years after negotiations had begun, with Russia’s formal ratification.4 As the agreement comes into force, the industrialised countries will be scrambling to put together a strategy to make sure the Treaty’s obligations are met. Some countries are pondering a ‘carbon tax’ to punish polluters – a move opposed by business groups – while others favour expansion of renewable energy, particularly nuclear power, and promotion of energy-saving technologies.

The underlining feature of the Treaty is the encouragement of international cooperation. The clean development mechanism, for example, will encourage the rich industrialised countries to finance projects that reduce emissions in developing countries in return for credit against their own emissions targets. The Treaty has significant implications for developing countries. Although they will not be required to reduce emissions towards specific targets, they will be required to act voluntarily to limit production of GHGs. The developing nations will benefit from the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, which they can use to pay for measures to anticipate and protect themselves from negative impacts of climate change.

The Message is in the Warming

Can then the Kyoto Treaty help initiate an environment-conscious energy policy? Given the fact that international politics is deeply rooted in the power axiom, a green-clean energy policy will continue to clash with national and strategic interest.

The world needs energy. World population has passed the six-billion-mark, yet one-third of the population lacks electricity. Poverty, suffering and global development requires constant, stable and affordable supply of energy. The current high price of oil, though not good for the public mood, is a boon for alternative energy, in particular, nuclear energy. But central to the debate on conventional/ non-conventional energy are the oil lobbyists, who have orchestrated an antinuclear campaign solely to protect their business interests. Here, the role of the media is striking: it readily gulps bad news on nuclear plants, whereas their effectiveness and safety standards are hardly ever analysed. The subject has to be demystified.

Nuclear energy is neither dead nor dying; 31 countries use nuclear energy and accounts for 16 per cent of world’s electricity.5 France generates 79 per cent of its electricity through nuclear power; Belgium 60 per cent; Sweden 42 per cent; Switzerland 39 per cent; Japan 34 per cent, Britain 21 per cent and the US 20 per cent.6 In the true spirit of the Kyoto Treaty, developing countries must encourage alternative sources of energy and fund the technology to the developing countries. Increasing global warming should make the case strong for nuclear energy and ‘North-South’ cooperation in this field will be welcome. Given the fact that the US has expressed grave reservations over Russia’s nuclear technology supply to India, its recent offer to part with civilian nuclear technology for energy-hungry India is indeed a positive signal. Moreover, the IAEA can be effectively strengthened to check whether such technology is being diverted for military purposes.7 In the light of this development, External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh’s recent remark at the Conference on “Emerging Nuclear Proliferation Challenges” organised by IDSA and Pugwash-India is significant. He said, “There is a need for a mindset change in dealing with emerging nuclear proliferation challenges. Approaches which have failed to restrain, let alone punish those guilty of proliferation need to be replaced by a new framework which, on the one hand, is effective in curbing proliferation and, at the same time, does not inhibit legitimate cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States whose non-proliferation records are beyond doubt... We are committed to further strengthening our regulatory framework in keeping with the changing technical and security challenges.” In the case of India, some of its nuclear plants are under IAEA safeguards, including the Russian-built Koodankulam plant in Tamil Nadu.

The risk attached to nuclear energy – health hazards, cost effectiveness and environmental scare – though not baseless, should not be an excuse to negate the importance of clean energy. There surely have been more human deaths and health hazards from oil exploration cum shipping and coal mines than nuclear plants. Moreover, nuclear plants follow health security and safety precautions more than any other conventional energy units. Sometime halfway through this century, there will be 10 billion energy-hungry people and taking the exhaustibility of fossil fuels and global warming into consideration, surely nuclear energy defines its point. We may yet be glad that we know how to tame the atom.

References/End Notes

Non-Traditional Security Energy Security India-US Ties Poised for Radical Re-orientation January 2005 C Uday Bhaskar

The new US Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, made her first halt in New Delhi on March 16, 2005 during her whistle-stop tour of Asia that took her across the continent to Japan and China, among other countries. The symbolism of identifying Delhi as her first destination reiterates the determination of the Bush team to consolidate the relationship with India and realise the potential hinted at during the first term, and this was emphasised by Rice during her visit. She noted that the foundation to the bilateral relationship was “the fact that we share common values, and there are no stronger relationships than those that are based on common values.”

This assertion is a marked contrast from the abiding pattern of the India-US relationship during the Cold War decades and the Clinton years, when despite the convergences in the value systems – by way of the commitment to the plural democratic principle – the world’s oldest and largest democracies were often at odds with each other. This may be attributed to the existential realities of the prevailing international strategic systemic during the Cold War and both nations had divergent perceptions about their respective security interests – particularly regarding the contentious nuclear issue and the nature of the US-Pakistan relationship. The general refrain in both New Delhi and Washington was that ‘other’ was acting in a manner detrimental to the strategic concerns of the former.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 lanced the festering boil that had bedevilled the bilateral relationship and towards the end of the Clinton presidency, a reasonably robust framework was in place, though the manner in which the differences over the nuclear issue (CTBT, for instance) would be resolved still remained blurred. However, when the Bush team came to power in early 2001, one of the first major decisions taken was to reverse the Clinton initiative on nuclear testing and set the CTBT aside. This decision was taken to safeguard US interests as perceived by the Bush team but the collateral was to remove one of the stumbling blocks in the India-US relationship. The events of 9/11, no doubt, overtook all other foreign policy priorities for the Bush team but by January 2004, the US had agreed to a new relationship with India – what is referred to as the NSSP, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership. The elements of this new framework (which incidentally the US has not yet extended to any other country) include cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, space, hi-tech commerce and a dialogue on missile defences.

The Rice visit in March noted the need to take the NSSP forward and reference was made to Phase II “which we look forward to having completed very shortly.” More than the tangible elements of the NSSP, Rice hinted at an intangible aspect apropos the perception about India in the emerging US security calculus and added, “we respect the possibilities that the United States and India enjoy for global partnership.”

Perhaps the import of this assertion was not adequately noted during the Rice visit but events clearly moved much faster than anticipated and on March 25, 2005 the US unveiled what appears to be a radically new policy towards South Asia. The gist of this was conveyed by US President George Bush to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the more visible strand in this was the US decision to supply F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan; a decision that had been kept on hold for almost 15 years. India conveyed its ‘disappointment’ since the F-16 has acquired a certain symbolism in the US-India-Pak matrix but this was muted. Later, it was added that as part of the new US policy to the region, similar offers on a much wider spectrum would be made available to India as well and the details of this were spelt out in a background briefing provided by the US State Department.

A review of the fine-print in this document indicates that the Bush team has outlined an ambitious policy towards South Asia and that the India-US relationship is poised for a radical re-orientation in terms of its strategic underpinning. For the first time, Washington has identified the South Asian region as being “vital to the future of the US” and, more importantly, it has asserted that the US “will help India become a major world power in the 21st century.” This aspect was further elucidated by US officials: “We understand fully the implications, including the military implications of that statement... that’s not just F-16s. It could be F-18s. But beyond that, the US is ready to discuss even more fundamental issues of defence transformation with India, including transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defence. Some of these items we may not be willing to sell Pakistan.”

There are many contradictions in the details of this new policy and on the face of it, the Bush team has been castigated by the liberal spectrum within the US for its double standards. This contradiction is most vividly reflected in the fact that the White House is staunchly supporting a military ruler in Islamabad even while being committed to the return of democracy in Pakistan by 2007 and is willing to live with the AQ Khan iceberg even though addressing nuclear transgressions are on top of the Bush priority list. Some have interpreted this initiative as a case of starting an arms race in the region but it may be averred that notwithstanding these contradictions, the US has for the first time crafted a comprehensive policy towards the region that is cognisant of the past and the mismatch between the short-term goals and long-term objectives that Washington has pursued.

While the F-16 has become the more visible issue, it would be misleading to associate the March 25th initiative only with the resumption of arms supplies to Pakistan. The F-16 deal has been in the pipeline for almost 15 years and has been withheld for various nuclear and other transgressions, including a coup by the Pakistani military. It is true that there has been no change of circumstances or behavioural pattern by Islamabad in that the military is still in power, the AQ Khan episode remains to be investigated and Islamabad’s support to religious radicalism and jehadi terrorism continues in a selective manner – albeit against India.

Thus, it is valid to ask if Pakistan is being rewarded despite its deviations from the core principles now being pursued by the White House, more so when the track record suggests that the Pak military leadership has always acted in an adventurist and belligerent manner when it has been enabled by Washington by way of military equipment – the 1965 Indo-Pak war is case in point. However it appears that this time, Washington is following a very carefully crafted carrot-andstick policy by way of dealing with Islamabad.

The US administration is fully aware of the many 9/11 related terrorist leads that point to Pakistan and the current turbulence in that society and its deep anti– US orientation. The roots of the current terrorist activity are deeply embedded in the Pak polity and the US had noted this in December last when it passed a law that requires the executive to report to Congress the progress made in the transformation of Pakistan. As part of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act passed by the US Congress in December, sections 4082 and 4083 are Pakistan specific. The former refers to the US Commitment to the Future of Pakistan and the latter is regarding authorisation to the US President to exercise waivers in respect of earlier sanctions imposed on Pakistan. Section 4082 is wide in scope and seeks to ‘de-jehadise’ Pakistan and encourage the emergence of a moderate Pakistan. This is many ways corresponds with the Indian long-term objective as well but there are divergences in the means adopted by the US.

As of now, 4082 states that it is the sense of Congress that the US should “over a long-term period, help to ensure a promising, stable and secure future for Pakistan” and in particular provide assistance to Islamabad in eight areas that include, inter alia, commitment to combating extremists; resolving outstanding difficulties with neighbours; fully control its territory and borders; become a more effective and participatory democracy; modernise its economy; halt the spread of WMD; reform the education system; and, implement a strategy of moderation.

More importantly, the law requires the US President to transmit to Congress a detailed strategy within 180 days about the nuts and bolts of how the objectives in 4082 will be achieved. Thus, by about mid June 2005, the US executive branch will have to inform the Congress about the progress made in this regard and from all accounts the Bush-Rice team are determined to keep the focus on democracy and genuinely representative governance as a core principle for compliance by Pakistan. There is little dissent that this will finally enable the beleaguered Pakistani civil society to reclaim the political space appropriated by the Pak military and the strengthening of the moderate, civilian political constituency will be in the true long-term interests of the Pakistani people.

Thus, while the F-16 has become the lightning rod in the Indian public perception about a shift in US policies, it is in many ways the less important issue. The more strategic and long-term policy assertion by Washington is about the transformation of Pakistan to becoming a more moderate state and society. This is an ambitious goal and history tells us that no military that has seized power has ever returned to the barracks in a voluntary manner. Whether General Musharraf will be the exception thanks to the Bush-Rice prescription remains to be seen and the future of the composite dialogue with India will be linked with the choice made by the Pakistani military leadership. The core issue essentially is the orientation of the GHQ in Rawalpindi and how they respond to the new US policy about democracy in Pakistan.

As far as India is concerned, the contours of the new US South Asia policy augur positively for the bilateral relationship and India’s aspirations in the emerging regional and global systemic. The manner in which cooperation in civilian nuclear issues and some weapon-related strands has been outlined has the potential to positively transform India’s status in the management of the emerging nuclear challenges. In like fashion, space is the next major domain for exploration and innovation with identifiable correspondences in the defence and development spheres.

Above all, it is significant that Washington has stated that a strong and credible India is in the overall US strategic interest in the post-9/11 global systemic. Whether India has a similar or empathetic perception about how to engage with the US is still moot. Deep reservations still exist in India about perceived US perfidy and these would have to be both acknowledged and assuaged in the ethos of a plural democracy. The areas and manner in which India wishes to deepen this relationship will have to be carefully analysed and a calibrated approach is called for. Some tension and frustration is inevitable in this dialogue for India and the US represent two very different and divergent strategic cultures and to-date their experience is more in managing estrangement than in engagement. There will have to be considerable learning on the job – the window of opportunity is brief and any major progress will have to be made within the first two years of the second Bush term.

There is little doubt that even if it is not stated explicitly, the US focus on democracy and the concert that has been identified in Asia – namely India, Japan and South Korea – will cause deep anxiety in China. The new US policy has been announced on the eve of the Chinese Prime Minister’s visit to India in April, which will be followed by that of the Japanese PM. Now more than ever India will have to retain its non-aligned posture and acquire the ability to improve bilateral relations with the major Asian powers individually even while allaying any anxieties about band-wagoning against one or the other.

If this US policy is realised on all fronts, two areas of abiding strategic concern for India – namely the nuclear and related hi-technology areas and the transformation of Pakistan – may be advanced in a manner that is favourable to India’s aspirations and principles. In such an exigency, history may well note March 25, 2005 as a major milestone in the evolution of India-US relations and the impact this has had on the regional strategic grid.

Nuclear and Arms Control India-US Relations, Nuclear Arms and Politics January 2005 K. Subrahmanyam

Before and during World War II, India was one of the many territorial commands of the British imperial defence system. When India became independent, the country was totally reliant on Britain for its armaments for the three services. There was some left over equipment of the US armed forces from the World War II period – Dakota aircraft, some Sherman tanks and transport vehicles. In 1948- 49, India attempted to obtain some US equipment, during the Kashmir war, using the personal friendship of Col B M Kaul (then posted as our defence attaché in Washington, who subsequently became Lt General) with then US Defence Secretary Louis Johnson. It did not succeed. However in 1950, India did import one division of Sherman tanks (of World War II vintage) from the US.

In the early 1950s, India obtained Ouragan and Mystere fighter bomber aircraft from France. Most of the armaments of the 1950s were purchased from Britain, including naval vessels, Centurion tanks, Canberra, Hunter, Sea Hawk and Gnat aircraft. AMX-13 light tanks, Alize aircraft, and Alouette helicopters were acquired from France. Only 106 mm recoilless guns and Fairchild Packet aircraft were from the US. Most of the electronic equipment licensed to be manufactured in Bharat Electronics were from British and French firms. Almost all our training programmes for middle level officers were in British institutions.

In 1954, the Soviet Union chose India as the first country (ahead of Egypt) to offer to sell military equipment. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru turned down the offer on the ground that any military relationship with the USSR at that stage would complicate India’s relationship with the Western Countries. In the late 1950s, India chose to purchase the first Mi-4 helicopters and AN-12 supply dropping aircraft from the USSR, to be used mostly in the Northern front. One wonders whether this was intended as a signal to China that the USSR was on the Indian side in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The US decision to arm six divisions of the Pakistani Army, and to provide Pakistan with the supersonic F-104 Star fighter, as also the Korean War vintage F-86 aircraft led to India’s search for a supersonic aircraft. Earlier, President Eisenhower’s offer to provide India with military equipment, analogous to those supplied to Pakistan, was turned down by India as that would have violated India’s non-aligned posture. The search for supersonic aircraft was focused on four models – the British Lightening, the French Mirage, the US Starfighter and the Soviet MiG-21. The British Lightening was not chosen by IAF; the French Mirage would have involved payment in hard currency, which India could not afford; and the US refused to licence production of Starfighter in India. Only the USSR was prepared to licence production of the MiG-21 in India on a five year credit (initially, and then extended to 10 years) to be repaid in non-convertible rupees (earned through Indian exports to USSR).

The decision was largely political and even though the IAF was not happy with the choice, it turned out to be a correct one. While the MiG-21s are still flying, the British Lightening, the French Mirage III and the US F-104 (the Widowmaker, as it came to be known) stopped flying long ago. There are scholars who are of the view that the Indo-Soviet MiG-21 agreement infuriated Beijing as China had been refused the very planes by the Soviets. The arms deal also demonstrated where the Soviet Union stood in the Sino-Indian conflict. Following the Chinese attack in October-November 1962, the Western countries and the Commonwealth promised military aid to India. The UK and the Commonwealth delivered their promised supplies. The US had promised infantry equipment for six mountain divisions, Fairchild Packet aircraft, six old dismantled radars to be installed only on the Northern frontier and not on the West, snow clearing equipment, some obsolescent signal equipment, a dismantled small arms ammunition factory; engineering equipment and such like. Though an agreement was signed between Y B Chavan and Robert McNamara on June 6, 1964, promising India US$250 million credit and $250 million grant for five years, it was made clear that the US would not provide India with combat equipment, given Washington’s sensitivity to Pakistan’s concerns. There is enough evidence to reveal that following the Indian debacle at Sela-Bomdila, the Americans had developed a low opinion about India, thinking that in any war between India and Pakistan, the latter would win. India was also importing PL 480 foodgrains from the US to feed its population afflicted by famine. Yet India was justifiably critical of US bombing of Vietnam thereby annoying the US leadership. Therefore, in US estimation India did not figure very highly.

In 1971, with Pakistan’s assistance the US succeeded in weaning the Chinese away from the Soviet Union and enlisting Beijing’s support for their strategy of containment of the USSR, to induce its break-up as was originally envisaged in 1946. India was seen as the Soviet Union’s ally. Further, the 1974 Indian nuclear test did not contribute to the promotion of friendly relations between India and US. This was followed by the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, which witnessed an active alliance between Pakistan and the US with tacit support by the Chinese. In return, the US looked away from Chinese assistance to Pakistan in nuclear weapon development and resumed massive military aid to Pakistan, including the F-16s. There was an attempt in 1980 for India to procure Tow missiles and 155- mm medium guns. But that attempt proved futile.

After 1964, when India was able to formalise its military equipment relationship with USSR, Moscow became almost the sole source of arms for India for all three services. Exceptions were Tom Cat missiles, Abbott self propelled guns, Harrier aircraft, Sea King helicopters, the carrier Viraat, HDW submarines, Bofors medium guns and Jaguar aircraft. The Cold War came to an end in 1990, and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the concessional arms supply to India on long term credit and for non-convertible rupees also came to an end. For some years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union there was also a significant breakdown in the supply system of Russia, along with an escalation in prices. In spite of this, since most of the equipment for the three services were of Soviet origin, there was a natural preference for Russian equipment. Further from the Russian perspective, India and China, to which Moscow had resumed arms sales in the mid-1990s, had became the largest arms purchasers.

From the above history it is clear that armament transactions are largely influenced by politics and do not occur in free market conditions. The US withheld arms from India when it valued Pakistan’s alliance more than India’s and had a poor opinion about India’s military capability. It is because of this negative attitude of the US that India had to turn to the USSR for arms in the 1960s though there was considerable reluctance among all three services to accept Soviet armaments. Contrary to popular perception, there had been no major reneging by the US on arms sales contracted with India. The Star Sapphire radars were gifts. Though the US stopped military supplies under credit and grant in 1965, the agreement between BEL and a US firm on licensed manufacture of ANPRC-215 wireless sets was unaffected. The US just did not generally sell armaments to India for political reasons. In a sense, this US policy turned out to be a blessing in disguise for India. The Soviets priced their arms very low, specially for India and sold them on extended credit terms and non-convertible rupees.

The valuation of Indian arms imports by western think-tanks (on corresponding western prices) and actual costs to India would reveal the extent of benefit India derived.

As the Cold War came to an end, in US victory and Soviet collapse, the US started preparing to re-evaluate its strategic policy towards South Asia. There were a series of reports on the US relationship with India and Pakistan, which emphasised the desirability of the US improving its relationship with India. However, till India conducted its Shakti and Agni III tests, the US attempted to cap, reduce and eliminate Indian nuclear capabilities. India knew that the LCA programme will come under sanctions when it decided on Shakti tests. During this period there was a deliberate looking away from Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation activities by US intelligence agencies for political reasons. The US’ trade and commercial relationship with China was also expanding rapidly. However, after the 1999 Kargil War, and realisation of the extent of Pakistani support to US-directed jihad, there was a deliberate attempt by the Clinton Administration to improve relations with India. The visit of President Clinton to India in March 2000 was a success and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee hailed the US as a natural ally. The vision statement issued during the Clinton visit by the two leaders registered a modest improvement in Indo-US relations. Still, the Clinton Administration had its reservations regarding Indian nuclear capability, was soft on China’s proliferation to Pakistan and proved incompetent to deal with Pakistani proliferation as well its infrastructural support to jihadi terrorism, Al Qaida and Taliban.

Even before taking office, the incoming Republican Administration had spelt out its plans for reshaping Asia in favour of US national interest. Dr Condoleezza Rice wrote in an article in Foreign Affairs, in January 2000: “But India is an element in China’s calculation and it should be in America’s too – India is not a great power yet but has the potential to emerge as one.”

The new Bush Administration did not bother India on the nuclear issue as the Clinton Administration had done. In 2002 the US National Security doctrine, President Bush referred positively to the role of India in international security. The Bush Administration was tougher on China about proliferation issues than Clinton had been. It invoked sanctions 60 times against Chinese entities in four years, as against eight times by the Clinton Administration in its two terms.

The Bush Administration also came up with its Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) with India. Any country with a modicum of foreign policy and strategic planning capabilities would have taken steps to assess why the US policy towards it was changing and what its implications were likely to be. However, in India a National Security Council is established but it never meets. Moreover, neither our political leaders nor our top bureaucrats place high value on the need for long range assessments of international developments. The US made yet another study on the possibilities of Indo-US military cooperation. The US Armed Forces carried out joint exercises with all three services of India, and the IAF was invited to take part in Air exercises in Alaska, which had hitherto been open only to military allies of the US.

Rice made India the first country she visited in her capacity as the Secretary of State, having earlier accompanied the President to Europe. She informed the Indian Prime Minister on March 15, 2005 of the proposed new US Strategy for South Asia, according to which the US intended to help India to become a major world power in the 21st century. It should be obvious that this is a totally new US strategy towards India, different from that prevailing in the last 58 years of bilateral history since India’s independence. Therefore, it would not be correct to make judgments on US arms transfer programmes to India on the basis of past history.

It is a widely accepted axiom all over the world that there are no permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but only permanent interests for a nation. This formulation was articulated by British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston in the mid nineteenth century and is often quoted by students of international relations. Another 2000 years before Palmerston, as recounted in the Indian epic, the Mahabharata, Bhishma, on his death bed, told the Pandavas that for a king no one was his friend or enemy but only circumstances determined the status of an interlocutor. Therefore it is futile to talk about the reliability of the US in terms of arms sales. For the last 58 years the US had never declared its intention of helping India become a major world power. Even President John F. Kennedy, much adored in India, did not do it.

Obviously Bush has not announced this radical shift in US policy to India because he suddenly loves India or has developed a liking for our culture, or admiration for our philosophy and civilisational tradition. The US must have done so in its own self interest and as the sole superpower interested in maintaining that status into the indefinite future. Recently, a number of studies have concluded that the threat to US pre-eminence would arise only from China, which is likely to overtake US in its aggregate GDP in the next two to three decades and later in R&D capability. There is also general agreement that wars among major world powers are unlikely to occur in the 21st century. In the next three decades, the US, China and India would be the top three markets in the world. Thereafter, the power of nations will grow in accordance or commensurate with the knowledge pool they are able to develop. The US looks at China as the possible challenger to its pre-eminence and hence, is interested to ensure that China is kept in the second place.

If in India we start making assessments about the long range evolution of international developments, it would be possible to understand why the US is developing its new strategy and why India has a large role in it. The US is a unique multi-cultural country with a large immigrant population from different parts of the world. The US is in a position to import some of the best brains from the rest of world by offering citizenship and using them to augment its knowledge pool. India happens to be an attractive source of knowledge for the US, being an Englishspeaking country, democratic and multi-cultural. Further, the Indian population profile in the next three decades makes it younger than both China and the US. India is likely to overtake China in terms of total population with a younger age profile because of the latter’s one-child policy and is likely to have a much larger pool of talent. The contribution of the Indian community in the US to its GDP and its knowledge pool encourages the US to look on Indian talent favourably. There are also uncertainties about the future stability of an un-democratic China. Some American business leaders and economists have taken the view that entrepreneurship and R&D flourish better in democratic India than in China with its highly centralised political culture. For these reasons the US leadership appears to have decided to help India in becoming a world power and, in return, expects to gain from Indian brainpower and through collaboration with India in science and technology.

If this is the case, where do India’s interests lie? What would India prefer – a world order in which the US continues to be pre-eminent or one in which China overtakes the US? While there is no doubt that the US has been hegemonic in its external policies, it is internally relatively more democratic than most other democracies, is multi-cultural and has a million and half Indian community, which is growing in strength steadily. While the US, after 58 years, is prepared to help India become a world power of the 21st century, China, till recently, considered India a regional power. For China, Pakistan is its Israel. While India should try to improve its trade with China as well as its political and technological relations, there can be no two opinions that the majority Indian preference will be for a world order in which the US rather than China is the pre-eminent power. Even in that world, India can play a balancing game between the two. In terms of contacts among populations, the magnitude of people-to-people contact between the US and India is significantly greater compared to those between China and India.

In a globalised world, where the currency of power will be knowledge instead of military might, the great game of nations will be played differently from the one we have been familiar with since the Napoleonic Wars. ’Soft power’ will play a significant role in international politics.

Therefore, one has to look at the radical change in Indo-US relations not on the basis of the experience of the past but on the basis of an assessment of the future. Just as Bhishma emphasised, the prevailing circumstances have changed. The US would still like to be the pre-eminent power of the world, with the highest per capita income for its citizens, and will use its technology, economy and soft power to exercise this dominance. The evolving circumstances are such that the US will need India more to sustain its pre-eminence than India would need the US to keep its ranking in international hierarchy.

In history, most countries, which rose to be world powers, did so only by depending initially on another. The US itself became a great power on the wings of imperial Britain and the protection of the Royal Navy. Japan became a great power by depending on the US after the Meiji restoration and becoming an ally of the US after its defeat in World War II. So did Germany. Communist Russia concluded the Treaty of Rapallo and invited German R&D to help them in their industrialisation and military development during the initial five year plans. China, under Mao Tse- Tung, gained from Soviet help in their industrialisation and development of military might up to the time of the Sino-Soviet split. Thereafter, the US helped China during the period of Deng Xiao Peng. Incidentally, while the Soviets were very dependable in their arms supplies to India, they broke off with China in 1960-61, highlighting that the arms relationship is not independent of political relationships. Within that context, Russia and China have now resumed their arms transfer relationship. Post-War Germany could not have become a world power without the Marshal Plan and US help. Therefore, there is no need for India to feel patronised because of the US announcement of its intention to help India become a world power.

India should count on its strengths in playing the 21st century game of nations in a globalised world, where knowledge will be the currency of power. Already it has been acknowledged that India will have the largest population with a younger age profile than China and the White nations. That would mean that other nations will soon reach a situation when their ratios of non-working population to working population would be more unfavourable than in India’s case. A Planning Commission study had concluded that in two to three decades, India would be the largest service provider to the world. It is logical to expect that India could also be the largest knowledge provider to the world as well.

In order to understand the globalised international system of the 21st century, many shibboleths of the 19th and 20th century have to be shed. Unfortunately, that is not happening fast enough in India. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh claims that the external environment had never been more favourable for India’s economic development and global financial flows are readily available to be tapped for India’s development, critics mired in schools of conventional thinking wax eloquent against speeding up the development process in this fashion – the strategy adopted by China.

Various leaderships in the world community have expressed their concern about the hegemony of the sole superpower and have declared their preference for a multi-polar world. Others have talked about a balance of power system involving US, Japan, European Union, China, Russia and India. The period between the Congress of Vienna and World War II saw a unipolar world – Pax Britannica. The bipolar world was an aberration caused by the fact that both the USSR and the US developed their nuclear-missile capabilities at the same time and were unable to go to war with one another. Once the US overtook the USSR in terms of dominance in military and civil technologies, and in economic power, the world became unipolar. Today the US has succeeded in developing better relations with each one of the other five powers than they have with each other. The US faces no military challenge from any of the other powers and has reason to worry only about the long term challenge from China, at a time when military might will no longer be the primary currency of power. But for the next two to three decades the US will be in a position to flaunt its military superiority and dominance over outer space as a currency of power and overwhelm military resistance from any developing nation, though it would have a lot of problems in stabilising an occupied developing nation. In these circumstances, the exercise of unilateral power to shape the international system, especially in respect of the developing world, by the US cannot be prevented by other major powers however shrill their rhetoric may be.

Given this reality, US unilateralism may be disapproved of by India but it need not come in the way of the development of Indo-US relations, so long as US actions do not hurt Indian national interests. Today US power operates in the vicinity of India. Unlike its predecessors, the Bush Administration is more mindful of Indian sensibilities. It collaborated with India on the tsunami relief operations in Sri Lanka, made common cause in respect of the royal coup in Nepal, and has expressed a desire to develop congruent policies with respect to Bangladesh. Whatever may be our differences in respect of the policy towards Pakistan, it is difficult to deny that General Musharraf’s relatively more restrained behaviour and reduction in terrorism in Kashmir are partly due to US pressure on Pakistan.

Once the US is reconciled to India’s nuclear and missile status there are no direct conflicts of interests between the two countries. Even during the years when we needed Soviet help, we disapproved of many Soviet actions such as those in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. However, we kept our criticism private and muted. Therefore it is not beyond our capability to cultivate close relations with US, even while disagreeing with Washington on specific issues. India, for its own national interest, dealt with Stalin and Mao Tse-Tung with their genocidal records. Ideological posturing was not Nehru’s style of foreign policy. That came about later. In terms of realpolitik there should be no insurmountable difficulty in having positive and mutually beneficial relations with the US in spite of its unilateralist proclivities.

Let us not make too much about the lack of UN approval for every security related action. We continued and completed successfully the Bangladesh war in spite of 110 nations voting against us in the UN. The UN majority approved of genocidal Pol Pot when we decided not to. Moreover, we know to our own cost (in Kashmir) that the UN cannot be expected to be objective and have therefore never gone back to the UN on any issue that affects our interests and security.

As the international community becomes increasingly globalised and economic and technological power replaces military might as the primary currency of power, unilateralism will slowly become dysfunctional. An international community with five or six major economic and technological power centres cannot be subjected to unilateralism.

An important aspect of the proposed US strategy towards India envisages the transfer of civil nuclear energy technology to India. No doubt, this too is being done in US’ own interest. The demand for fossil fuels in India and China are growing. The US, unlike the European countries has not joined the Kyoto protocol. There are signs that US itself may go back to nuclear energy. Moreover to reduce China’s demand for fossil fuel, the US is to supply China with $5 billion worth of nuclear reactors. Pursuing the same logic, the US proposes to consider transfer of civil nuclear technology to India, and the details are still to be worked out. However, the proposed US policy is more internally consistent than that of the European powers and China. The latter still insist on India being penalised for conducting the 1998 nuclear tests and being subjected to Nuclear Suppliers Group sanctions. It would be imprudent on our part if we do not explore the US proposal and find ways and means of obtaining civil nuclear technology from the US without in any way undermining our status as a nuclear weapon state.

It should be understood that the policies of the present Bush Administration mark a watershed in US foreign policy towards India. Until now, the US has been dominated by an ideological foreign policy which was essentially anti-Soviet, and focused on a brutal struggle for power. The US prejudices against India arose out of its wrong assessment about perceived Indian alignment. (The US is not new to faulty intelligence assessment, now highlighted by the 9/11 Report and the Iraq Report. There is a long history to such experience). The Clinton Administration did not totally shed its Cold War baggage in its perception of India, though perhaps Clinton himself may have developed a better perspective in the last 18 months of his presidency.

The current Bush Administration has declared its intention to pursue its national interest in the non-ideological world of today. Therefore, it would be a mistake to judge it by our experience of the last 58 years. In the US eyes, I was labelled as anti-American and pro-Soviet while in reality I was and am fiercely pro-Indian. Now I recognise the fundamental changes in US policy and their need for India. Therefore I am advocating an Indian foreign policy that will continue to be pro- Indian and take full advantage of the changed circumstances in the world.

Defence Economics & Industry India, Defence Cooperation, Arms Adeel Khan, The Politics of Identity and Stephen P Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan January 2005 Ashok K. Behuria

The paper seeks to study the challenges faced by the Pakistani state from the perspective of its vast ethno-cultural diversity which problematises the process of-nation building attempted by the Pakistani leadership since its very inception. The paper starts with a rudimentary definitional view of the concept of ethnicity and nationalism, and isolates the areas of friction in the way the Pakistani nation has been conceptualised and the way diverse ethno-cultural groups have evolved their identity through history.

Japanese Security at the Crossroads: Challenge and Initiatives October 2004 G. V. C. Naidu

In the emerging complex security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese security policies appear to be undergoing dramatic changes. The alliance with the US, especially the presence of American troops, is facing with some uncertainty after 9/11. The rise of China as a major economic and military power is seen to pose a serious challenge to Japan. Moreover, North Korea’s unabated attempts to develop WMD capabilities along with ballistic missiles threaten Japanese security directly. In response, Japan has initiated certain significant steps. It has sent troops to a combat zone, participated in US counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, decided to deploy the ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and is in the process of revising its Constitution to enable it play a larger security role.

East Asia Afghanistan, Japan Japan’s Changing Role in the US-Japan Security Alliance October 2004 Arpita Mathur

The US-Japan security arrangements have formed one of the most significant pillars of Japan’s security strategy ever since the end of the Second World War. However, what is noteworthy is the incremental growth in the Japanese profile within the alliance, from the time of its inception to the present. This paper traces the growing Japanese role within the alliance and argues that the relationship is likely to remain robust in the foreseeable future. Japan’s changing security policy as well as its augmented role within the parameters of the partnership has ensured that the alliance has made a marked shift from being asymmetrical to a mutually beneficial and reciprocal arrangement.

East Asia Japan, US-Japan Relations Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions October 2004 Shah Alam

Iran-Pakistan relations have had a distinct characteristic over the past five decades and Islamabad’s clandestine transfer of nuclear technology and materials to Iran underlines its significance. Political and strategic imperatives have formed the basis of their close relationship despite divergence of interests and political outlook on regional and global issues. Both the countries have tried to reconcile the differences and consolidate their ties. Iran’s concerns regarding the perceived dangers of containment by the US, the challenges flowing from developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to ensure balance of power with Saudi Arabia and earlier Iraq, and its concerns about the sectarian violence in Pakistan have deeply influenced the vitality of Iran-Pakistan relationship. This paper traces the evolution of Iran- pakistan relations and argues that the politico-strategic contours of the South-West Asian region will be shaped as a result of divergent developments in Iran and Pakistan – Iran’s improvements in ties with India and Pakistan’s relations with the US.

South Asia Iran, Pakistan-Iran Relations, Pakistan Post-War Afghanistan: Reconstructing a Failed State October 2004 K. R. Singh

Afghanistan once represented a fragmented and failed socio-economic and political entity. Operation Enduring Freedom, while targeting the Taliban and Al Qaida as part of the global war on terrorism helped create the structure of a new Afghan State. This article analyses the challenges faced by Afghanistan and how the new Afghan elite and its foreign supporters seek to address them through constitutional means. The New Constitution provides the framework of how Afghanistan wishes to reconstruct the new State. While it does concede the right of popular participation, its highly centralised form of government and unitary system that sidelines the political ramifications of ethnic nationalism are likely to pose serious challenges to nation-building. It might even push the central government to rely more upon foreign forces, mostly from the NATO countries. The situation is volatile and is likely to lead to conflict escalation unless the central government as also its foreign supporters are prepared to make major compromise with local ethnic leaders/warlords, and thus bypass provisions of the Constitution. However, that will in turn set a wrong precedent for a new State.

South Asia Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Global War on Terror (GWOT), Taliban
Publication | Page 655 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2025)
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